We suggest an alternative way of analyzing the canonical Bergstrom-BlumeVarian model of non-cooperative voluntary contributions to a public good that avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased. We exploit this approach to analyze models in which the aggregate level of public good is determined as a more general social composition function of individual gifts -speci…cally, as a generalized CES form -rather than as an unweighted sum as well as the the weakest-link and best-shot models suggested by Hirshleifer. In each case, we characterize the set of equilibria, in some cases establishing existence of a unique equilibrium as well as brie ‡y pointing out some interesting comparative static properties. We also study the weakest-link and best-shot limits of the CES composition function and show how the former can be used for equilibrium selection and the latter to show that equilibria of some better-shot games are identical to those of the much simpler best-shot game.
Introduction
The canonical model of non-cooperative public good provision set out by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian [2] -hereafter BBV -is a prominent example of a noncooperative game with an aggregative structure. The common object of all players' preferences is a simple aggregate, the unweighted sum of all individual contributions g i , and each player's preferences can be represented by a payo¤ function of the form i (g i ; G), where G = P j g j . We study a systematic way of exploiting its aggregative structure that avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players grows and thereby simpli…es its analysis. This permits us to extend the model by allowing G to be a more general (social composition) function of individual contributions, rather than an unweighted sum. This extra generality allows us to consider weaker link and better shot situations, of which Hirshleifer's [7] weakest link and best shot games are extreme cases. Social composition functions involving weaker-link public goods exhibit a convex technology for transforming individual contributions into the aggregate level of G, and imply a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. Situations involving better-shot public goods have non-convex social composition functions and, typically, multiple equilibria. Our approach also elucidates structural properties of equilibria and comparative statics properties. To avoid excessive length, we avoid a full treatment of these topics, con…ning ourselves to passing remarks.
In Sections 2 and 3, we show how "replacement functions"o¤er a simple and intuitive proof of existence, uniqueness and neutrality in the canonical model of BBV. The main aim of these sections is to set the scene for extensions of the canonical model which yield to modi…cations of this approach. For example, in Section 4, we show how easily an appropriate rede…nition of replacement functions shows that Hirshleifer's weakest-link model has a continuum of Pareto ranked equilibria. A more radical extension of the replacement function can be used to analyze games in with a generalized concave CES social composition function. In Section 5, we prove that such games always have a unique equilibrium. The fact that the weakest link composition function can be viewed as a limiting case of CES suggests using the limiting equilibrium to select from the continuum of equilibria under weakest link. We show that this can indeed be done, but it does not typically select the Pareto dominant equilibrium. A further extension of replacement functions (to correspondences) allows us to handle non-concave social composition functions and we illustrate this by discussing games with convex CES composition functions and Cobb-Douglas preferences in Section 6. When the (negative) elasticity of substitution is close enough to zero, we o¤er a complete characterization of the set of equilibria. In particular, we characterize all possible sets of players active in some equilibrium and show that, given such a set, the equilibrium is uniquely determined. A …nal extension (to "upper" replacement functions) allows us to characterize the set of equilibria in best-shot games and to show that Pareto-improving and coordination-resolving transfers may be available in such games. Finally, we show that when the elasticity of substitution is negative and close enough to zero in the better-shot game, the set of equilibria coincides with that in the best-shot game.
The Canonical Model
We generally follow BBV's notation and assumptions. Their model has four elements:
1. Individual Preferences Player i , i = 1; :::; n, has preferences represented by the utility function u i (x i ; G), where x i 0 is the quantity of a private good and G the total quantity of a pure public good. BBV do not explicitly impose much structure directly on preferences. In particular, they assume that both goods are desirable and strictly normal. For convenience, we shall assume, without explicit statement, that u i is continuously di¤erentiable. Then, binormality implies that marginal rates of substitution are is strictly decreasing in G and non-decreasing in g i . Note that increasing, strictly binormal preferences preferences are also strictly convex.
2. Individual Budget Constraints Player i's budget constraint requires that
where g i = 0 is her contribution to a pure public good, or her gift, and w i is her exogenous income.
The Social Composition Function
The total public good provision is the unweighted sum of individual gifts 1 :
4. The Behavioral Assumption The game is a static, or simultaneous, noncooperative game in which the strategic choice variables are the individual gifts, (g 1 ; g 2 ; :::; g n ).
BBV demonstrate the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Existence is established by appealing to Brouwer's …xed point theorem, and uniqueness by an argument tailored to the public good model. Although there is no doubting its formal correctness, their uniqueness argument has not struck all readers as intuitively transparent 2 . Their comparative static analysis proceeds by direct examination of the budget set, and establishes the well-known neutrality result associated with income redistributions amongst contributors, as well as the limits on redistributions that maintain neutrality.
3 An Alternative Approach: The Replacement Function
Cornes and Hartley [5] formally demonstrate the existence, and explore the properties, of the replacement function r i of Player i, which expresses the player's best response as a function, not of the sum of best responses of all other players, but of the total level of public good G. That is, g i = r i (G) if and only if the strategy choice of Player i is g i in all Nash equilibria in which aggregate public good provision is G. (This includes the player's own choice amongst the arguments of the function.) They use replacement functions to provide simple analyses of existence, uniqueness and comparative static properties of equilibrium in simple public good models. We now brie ‡y sketch a derivation of replacement functions and their properties from …rst principles. This proves a useful baseline for subsequent discussions.
Denote player i's marginal rates of substitution 3 by
. Then, taking g i and G as arguments, her best response satis…es precisely one of the following conditions:
We …rst establish that there is at most a single best reply by player i, b g i , consistent with a given value of G. To see this, …x G. An increase in g i implies a reduction in x i which, because of normality, implies a reduction in M RS i . Hence M RS i (g i ; G) is strictly decreasing in g i and there is a unique b g i satisfying one of the three conditions above.
Now consider an increase in G. For any given value of g i , an increase in G implies, again through normality, a lower value of M RS i . Hence, an increase in G shifts the graph of M RS i against g i downwards. This implies that, if initially w i > b g i > 0, then b g i decreases in response to the increase in G. Figure 1 graphs the replacement function whose existence and monotonicity have been established. It also shows several further properties that we have not explicitly discussed.
Cornes and Hartley [5] treat these matters more fully. For present purposes, the following observations are su¢ cient: Proposition 3.1 In the canonical public good model, player i has a replacement function r i (G) with the following properties:
1. There exists a …nite value, G i , at which
4. r i (G) is everywhere non-increasing in G, and is strictly decreasing wherever it is strictly positive.
Here, G i is the level of the public good that Player i would prefer, if that player were the sole contributor. Replacement functions can be used to study equilibria via the following characterization, whose proof is trivial.
Characterization of a Nash equilibrium A strategy pro…le b g is a Nash equilibrium if and only if b g j = r j b G for j = 1; : : : ; n,
Note that b G is an equilibrium level of the public good if and only if it is a …xed point of the aggregate replacement function R (G) = P n j=1 r j (G). It follows that, if R has a unique …xed point, the game has a unique equilibrium. This will happen if R is continuous, strictly decreasing where positive and has a graph that crosses the 45 line. Exactly these properties follow from Proposition 3.1 which establishes the following result. Not only do existence and uniqueness follow directly from simple geometric considerations. So, too, do other properties of equilibrium, including comparative static responses. We draw attention to two such results. Knowledge of the aggregate G uniquely determines the choice of private good consumption of a positive contributor -this is determined as the point on the income expansion path corresponding to the given value of G. The following theorem follows immediately: Theorem 3.2 Let players i and j be positive contributors at equilibrium in the canonical model. Suppose further that they have identical preferences. Then their equilibrium consumption bundles and utility levels are identical, even if their initial incomes di¤er.
The second property is that of neutrality. At a given value of G, a change in a contributors's income brings about an equal change in her level of contribution, as long as she remains at an interior solution:
It follows immediately that a transfer between two players who make positive contributions both before and after the transfer leaves the equilibrium allocation una¤ected. The upward shift in one replacement function precisely cancels out the downward shift in the other, leaving the graph of the aggregate replacement function una¤ected in the neighborhood of equilibrium. This gives the neutrality property:
Theorem 3.3 In the canonical model, a pure redistribution of income among a set of positive contributors that leaves that set unchanged has no e¤ect on the equilibrium allocation.
Before our extension of the model in the following section, we introduce an alternative function, and an alternative way of characterizing a Nash equilibrium. This proves more convenient than the replacement function in certain settings. Dividing both sides by G, the equilibrium characterization becomes: b G is an equilibrium level of the public good if and only if
where s i (G) = r i (G) =G is the share function of Player i and S (G) is the aggregate share function. The equilibrium strategy of Player i is b g i = b
Gs i b G . The advantage of using share functions is that a decreasing aggregate share function is su¢ cient for uniqueness and, although a decreasing aggregate replacement function entails this property, it is possible for share functions to be decreasing even where replacement functions are increasing or constant.
Weakest-link Public Goods
The approach of the previous section can be adapted to Hirshleifer's weakestlink and best-shot public good games. In this section, we discuss the weakest link social composition function (SCF): G = min j=1;:::;n g j , deferring treatment of the best-shot case to Section 7. We approach equilibria through the replacement function r i of Player i, where r i (G) is the unique strategy of the player in all equilibria in which aggregate level of the public good is G.
Let G i denote the preferred level of the public good of Player i as sole contributor and G i = min j6 =i g j . For all contribution levels such that G i G i , Player i will want to match the smallest of the other contributions, since her preferences are convex. In this event, her best response is b g i = G i and the total quantity of the public good is G = min fb g i ;
, Player i will only want to contribute up to the level G i , and no further. His contribution then determines the value of the weakest link. In this event, G = min fb g i ; G i g = G i . It follows that
Proposition 4.1 If Player i has convex increasing preferences, her replacement function has domain 0; G i and satis…es r i (G) = G in this domain.
Nash equilibrium levels of the public good are still …xed points of the aggregate replacement function R, provided the de…nition of R is modi…ed to R (G) = min j=1;:::;n r j (G). The domain of R is the intersection of the domains of individual replacement functions, so
We may conclude that any non-negative level of the public good not exceeding any individually preferred level is an equilibrium. g min j=1;:::;n G i .
Thus, there is a continuum of Pareto ranked equilibria. Introspection has suggested to students of this model that the salient equilibrium is precisely the value b g = min j=1;:::;n G i , which Pareto-dominates all the others. Experimental evidence has not o¤ered unquali…ed support to Pareto dominance as a selection criterion 4 . Vicary and Sandler [16] , [13] and [17] explore weakest-link games in which players are able to make income transfers.
More General Concave Social Composition Functions

Properties of the social composition function
In this and the next sections, we revisit the extension of the canonical model suggested by Cornes (1993) focussing on CES social composition functions. Indeed, in this section, we analyze a generalization of this SCF, which takes the following form:
where 1 ; : : : ; n > 0. In this section, we use share functions to show that, under parameter restrictions implying that the SCF is concave, the voluntary provision game has a unique equilibrium.
In the next section we analyze convex CES SCFs, where it is necessary to extend the concepts of replacement and share functions to correspondences. Throughout this section we consider two distinct parameter regimes that imply a concave social composition function.
Parameter Set 1 We have 0 < i 1 and for i = 1; : : : ; n and max j=1;:::;n j < 1.
The left-hand inequality excludes = 0. Of course, if i = for all i and ! 0, the function (1) approaches Cobb-Douglas (with parameters i = P n j=1 j ): We do not explicitly study this case, but the principal qualitative conclusions (existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium) are the same as those under Parameter Set 1.
Parameter Set 2 We have
i < 0 for i = 1; : : : ; n.
Since all i < 0 in Parameter Set 2, we cannot use (1) to calculate G when some g i = 0; in this case we simply set G = 0, to ensure continuity.
Under either parameter set, G is a strictly increasing function of each g i . Both parameter sets obviously include a CES SCF as a special case. However, Parameter Set 1 also includes, for example, a sum of constant elasticity production functions:
We will show that, under both parameter sets, a unique equilibrium exists. However, the two sets imply interestingly contrasting comparative static responses. In our analysis, it will prove convenient to use the facts that
and, when (3) holds,
using (3) to obtain the second line. We can use the inequality
to deduce the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1 Marginal SCF: @G=@g i is non-increasing in g i and strictly decreasing unless we have Parameter Set 1 with i = and g i = 0.
Preferences
We maintain the assumptions of increasing preferences and binormality as in the canonical model of BBV. We …nd it convenient to write player i's payo¤ function of strategy pro…le g = (g 1 ; : : : ; g n ) as i (g) = u i (w i g i ; G).
Best responses, replacement and share functions
In this subsection, we show that under binormality and Parameter Sets 1 or 2, replacement functions and therefore share functions exist. We also show that share functions are monotonic in G.
Characterizing best responses
The marginal payo¤ of Player i (holding g i …xed) can be written
.
Both terms outside the braces are positive (by binormality and (3)), so @ i =@g i has the same sign as the term in braces. Furthermore, an increase in g i leads to an increase in G and therefore a decrease in w i g i and, by binormality, a strict decrease in M RS i . Lemma 5.1 shows that an increase in g i cannot cause an increase in @G=@g i and therefore (@G=@g i ) 1 cannot decrease. Together, these observations show that the term in braces is strictly decreasing in g i . Hence i is a concave function of g i , and the …rst order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for best responses.
Using (3), these conditions can be written: g i 2 (0; w i ] and
with equality if g i < w i .
Note that (@G=@g i ) 1 = 0 at g i = 0, so this boundary value can never be a best response. For any g i , de…ne
and observe that best responses to g i only depend on G i . We shall write b i (G i ) for the best response to g i and recall that b i is a continuous function. In the case of Parameter Set 1, it is possible to have
; w i g i and therefore satis…es (4) with
1= and note that this is the level of the public good Player i would provide if she were the sole contributor. Under Parameter Set 2, taking the limit of g j ! 1 for all j 6 = i in (1) gives
1= again and G i is still the preferred level of the public good of Player i.
Characterizing replacement functions
It follows from Assumption A that, if we hold G …xed, M RS i (G; w i g i ) is non-increasing in g i . Furthermore, the right hand side of (4) is strictly increasing in g i and has zero slope at g i = 0 (since i < 1). We can deduce that, for all G > 0, (4) has a unique solution. We record this result below and illustrate it in Figure 2 . The proof of the second assertion is a little intricate and given in the appendix We shall write r i (G) for the unique g i satisfying (4), where r i is the replacement function of Player i. The previous paragraph shows that r i is
LHS of (4) RHS of (4) MRS (G, w g )
LHS of (4) RHS of (4) MRS (G, w g ) 
for all G > 0 and we note that P n j=1 s j (G) = 1 is a necessary and su¢ -cient condition for positive G to be a Nash equilibrium level of public good provision.
It is convenient, when studying the share function, to rewrite the interior …rst-order condition (4) with i = s i (G) as
Holding i …xed, an increase in G leads to a strict decrease in M RS i and no decrease G ( = i ) 1 [under the assumptions of either parameter set.] Thus, the graph of the left-hand side of (6) shifts up, whereas the right-hand side shifts down or is unchanged. This is illustrated in Figure 3 and shows that
decreases. Under Parameter Set 1 this means that i decreases, whereas,
LHS of (6): G LHS of (6): G > G ' Under Parameter Set 2, s i has domain 0; G i , is strictly increasing and has the limits s i (G) ! 0 as G ! 0 and
Continuity of s i follows from continuity of both M RS i and the right-hand side of (6). The limit s i (G) ! 0 under Parameter Set 1 is a consequence of the budget constraint: r i (G) w i for all G. The two possible forms for the share function are illustrated in Figure 4 .
We can deduce from the proposition that, under Parameter Set 1, the aggregate share function P n j=1 s j (G) is at least one if G = max j=1;:::;n G i , is continuous and strictly decreasing and approaches zero as G ! 1. It follows that the game has a unique equilibrium. Under Parameter Set 2, the aggregate share function is continuous and increases strictly from a value less that unity to a value greater than unity. Again, the game has a unique equilibrium. The following theorem records these results. 
Cobb-Douglas preferences and the weakest-link limit
In general it is not possible to derive analytical forms for replacement or share functions. This is true even for Cobb-Douglas preferences and a CES SCF. However, in this case we can …nd an explicit expression for the inverse of the replacement function. This enables us to examine the properties of the replacement function by studying the graph of this expression and re ‡ecting it in the 45 line. In this subsection, we illustrate this procedure and apply it to the study of the limit ! 1, and comparison of the weaker link and weakest link games. We shall assume that Player i has utility function
where i > 0 for all i and that the SCF takes the CES form:
, the …rst-order conditions (4) cannot be satis…ed at g i = w i . Hence, all best responses are interior and the replacement function satis…es r i (G) = g i , where g i is the unique solution of
and
. That is, the graph of the replacement function is that portion of the re ‡ection of the graph of satisfying
. This is illustrated in Figure 5 .
A CES SCF with all i = 1 approaches the weakest-link SCF as ! 1. Indeed, the CES SCF replacement function approaches the weakest link replacement function (pointwise) as the elasticity of substitution in the same limit. This follows by rewriting expression (7) as
and, noting that g i =w i 2 (0; 1), which implies that G ! g i as ! 1. One might hope that the limit (if it exists) of the unique equilibrium of the weaker link game unambiguously selects the Pareto dominant pro…le from the continuum of equilibria found in the weakest link case. This need not be the case, however, as the following example illustrates.
Suppose there are n 2 players and i = > 0; w i = w > 0; i = 1 for all i. We shall write r for the (common) replacement function of all players. Since the equilibrium is unique, it must be symmetric. This means that the equilibrium strategy pro…le is b g = (b g; : : : ; b g), where b g = r b G and b G = nb g . Substituting in (7), gives Recall that G i = g i , where g i maximizes u i (g i ; w i g i ).
In the example, this gives
The Pareto dominant equilibrium of the weakest link game has g i = G i for all i and, since n 2, this is not selected in the limit.
6 Convex CES SCF
Best responses and the replacement correspondence
When the SCF is not concave, even qualitative results are more sensitive to the speci…c form of the SCF and preferences. However, the approach of the preceding sections may still be adapted to handle such cases, provided we extend replacement and share functions to correspondences. To justify this claim, we focus on Cobb-Douglas preferences:
with i > 0 for all i and CES SCF
. with > 1. In such a game, multiple equilibria are possible. However, provided is large enough, we can characterize sets of positive contributors and, given such an equilibrium set, show that the equilibrium is unique. For even larger , all equilibrium sets consist of a single player. In the next section, we will show that, for such , the equilibria coincide with those for the best-shot SCF.
Our approach uses a set-valued extension of replacement and share functions and we start by examining best responses. The payo¤ function of Player i is
where g = (g 1 ; : : : ; g n ) and the strategy set is [0; w i ]. Writing
, it is clear that the best response to g i actually depends only on G i and we write B i (G i ) for the set of best responses:
Intuitively, we might expect that, if the contributions of the other players are su¢ ciently large, a given player will free ride by contributing nothing. Indeed, we shall show that there is a critical value of G i above which zero is the unique best response for Player i. Below this value, there is a single interior best response, which is a stationary point of i : At the critical value, both of the two strategies become alternative best responses.
Lemma 6.1
The following equations in (g i ; G i ):
have a unique positive solution g i > 0; G i > 0. The best response correspondence satis…es
The intuition behind this result is displayed in Figure 6 . As a function of own strategy, each player's payo¤ i can take one of three forms. For large enough G i , the payo¤ decreases strictly as g i goes from 0 to w i , (see …rst panel). For smaller G i , as g i increases from 0 to w i , the payo¤ initially decreases, then increases to a local maximum and …nally decreases to zero at g i = w i . The local maximum must be a stationary point: it satis…es (8). At G i = G i , the value of the payo¤ at the local maximum is the same as that at g i = 0. Equation (9) states this equality. For G i < G i , the payo¤ at the local maximum exceeds that at g i = 0 and the local maximum is therefore the global maximum (see second panel), whereas for G i > G i the payo¤ is higher at g i = 0, which is the maximum in this case (see third panel.) Formal proof of these assertions may be found in the Appendix. We de…ne the replacement correspondence of Player i to be R i (G), where g i 2 R i (G) if and only if g i is a best response to G i , where
Since G = G i if g i = 0, the characterization of the replacement function becomes a corollary of Lemma 6.1.
Proposition 6.1 We have g i 2 R i (G) if and only if (i)
Equation (13) and the right-hand inequality in (14) are simply restatements of (10) and (11) using (12) . The left-hand inequality is equivalent to the requirement G i 0.
Properties of the replacement and share correspondences
In this subsection, we explore the properties of R i , noting that, if g i 2 R i (G) and g i > 0, then (g i ; G) must satisfy (13) . Proposition 6.1 allows us to view the replacement correspondence as the re ‡ection in the 45 line of that portion of the graph of the function
which also satis…es (14) . Note that the right hand side of (15) vanishes at g i = 0 and g i = w i and has a unique maximum at g i = (1 1= ) w i . It is clear from Lemma 6.1, that the boundary line of the left-hand inequality in (14) , G = 1= i g i , crosses (15) at g i ; G i , where g i = w i = (1 + i ) and G i = 1= i g i , whereas the boundary curve of the right-hand inequality in (14) crosses (15) to the left of this point, at (g i ; G) = (g i ; G ), where
We shall initially analyze the case 1 + (1= i ), for then both g i ; G i and (g i ; G i ) lie to the left of (or at) the maximum of the function (15) . This puts both points on the increasing portion of this function and implies that the positive portion of the replacement correspondence runs from G i to G i and is increasing in this interval. This is the case illustrated in Figure 7 The share correspondence is de…ned as
and simple de…nition chasing veri…es that b G is an equilibrium level of the public good if and only if there is b i 2 S i b G for all i such that P n j=1 b j = 1. The associated equilibrium strategy pro…le is b g, where (13) can be written
This can be solved for G as a function of i : (16) and this function has derivative
In the case that 1 + 1= i , this derivative is positive, since we also have i < 1. Since the function on the right-hand side of (16) is continuous and de…ned on a compact set, its inverse is also continuous. If we de…ne i = i g i =G i , the following proposition summarizes these observations and is illustrated in Figure 8 .
Proposition 6.2 If
1+1= i , the graph of S i is the disjoint union of two sets: (G; 0) : G G i and (G; s i (G) ) : G i G G i . Furthermore, s i is continuous, strictly increasing and satis…es s i (G i ) = i > 0 and s i G i = 1.
Whenever the graph of a correspondence with domain a subset of the real numbers is the disjoint union of a …nite family of connected sets, we refer to each of the correspondences whose graphs are these sets as components. When a component is singleton-valued, we also refer to the function de…ned When < 1 + 1= i , the portion of the graph of (15) satisfying (14) need not be increasing. Indeed, it may include increasing and decreasing sections or even have no increasing section 5 . Re ‡ection in the 45 line shows that the positive component of S i may not be single valued, or it may be a decreasing function. Nevertheless, if g 2 R i (G) satis…es g > 0, then g g i . Hence, Corollary 6.1 holds for all > 1. It can also be shown that g i ! 0 as ! 1. This shows that the disconnected nature of the replacement and share correspondences disappears as ! 1. Furthermore, it remains true that g i 2 R i G i and that R i (and S i ) has two components. We must modify Proposition 6.2 as follows. 
Equilibria
In this subsection, we characterize equilibria, starting with the case where 1 + 1= i for all i. If we let = min j=1;:::;n j , this is equivalent to 1 + 1= . First note that the domain of the replacement correspondence of Player i is G i ; 1 . Hence, any equilibrium public good quantity must satisfy G G = max j=1;:::;n G j . For Player i to be active (that is make a positive contribution), the equilibrium public good quantity must satisfy
If there is some equilibrium in which a player is active, we call that player potentially active. It follows from Proposition 6.2 that Player i is potentially active if and only if G i G. If this inequality is not satis…ed, we call Player i always inactive. For each potentially active player, there is an equilibrium in which that player is the sole contributor, but there may also be equilibria with several contributors.
Theorem 6.1 Suppose that
1 + 1= and J is a non-empty set of potentially active players. There is a unique equilibrium with J as the set of active players if and only if
Furthermore, all equilibria are of this form.
The result is a corollary of Proposition 6.2. The …rst inequality is a consequence of the requirement that the equilibrium value G must lie in the domain of s j and therefore satis…es G j G G j for all j 2 J. The proposition also implies that P j2J s j (G) is a continuous, strictly increasing function satisfying
where k 0 2 arg min k2J G k . Therefore P j2J s j (G) takes the value 1 if and only if (18) holds and, furthermore, does so for a single value of G. We refer to any set J satisfying (17) and (18) as an equilibrium set and write b G (J) for the corresponding equilibrium value of G.
The share correspondences also determine the strategies played by the active players in an equilibrium set. Speci…cally, suppose j is a player in equilibrium set J and Player j plays b g j in equilibrium. Then,
which implies that
Of course, b g k = 0 for all k = 2 J. It is an immediate corollary of Theorem 6.1 that proper subsets of equilibrium sets are themselves equilibrium sets.
Corollary 6.2 Suppose that
1 + 1= , that J is an equilibrium set that and non-empty K satis…es K J (strict inclusion). If 1 + 1= , then K is an equilibrium set and b
Note that under the supposition of the corollary, if J and K are distinct equilibrium sets satisfying K J, all players not in K prefer this smaller equilibrium (as they free ride on a larger quantity of the public good.)
In a symmetric game, in which all players have the same preferences, we can be more precise in characterizing equilibrium sets. In such a game, the inequality (17) is super ‡uous and the inequality (18) is equivalent to jJj 1, where jJj denotes the cardinality of J and = i for all i.
Corollary 6.3
If all players have the same preferences, a set of players is an equilibrium set if and only if it is non-empty and has at most b1= c members, where bxc denotes the integer part of x.
When < 1 + 1= i for at least one i, we have seen that the positive component of the share correspondence need no longer be strictly increasing or even a function. This means that it is no longer possible to characterize equilibria as fully. The best that can be done is to give a su¢ cient condition related to Theorem 6.1. We need to extend our previous de…nition by saying that Player i is potentially active if min
this is just a generalization of our original de…nition.) The following result follows directly from Proposition 6.3 and continuity.
Proposition 6.4 If J is a non-empty set of potentially active players such that P j2J j 1, there exists an equilibrium with J as the set of active players.
It follows that, for each potentially active player, there is an equilibrium with that player as the sole contributor. However, we cannot conclude that subsets of equilibrium sets are also equilibrium sets, since the condition in the proposition is su¢ cient but not necessary.
7 Best-shot Public Goods
Equilibria
The best-shot SCF is G = max j=1;:::;n g j .
With such an SCF, replacement correspondences need not be well-de…ned. It is possible to have equilibrium strategy pro…les b
For example, suppose G i denotes the preferred level of the public good of Player i as sole contributor and G i = max j6 =i g j . Then g i = G i is the best response to G i = 0, whereas g i = 0 is the best response to G i = G i and in both cases G = max fg i ; G i g = G i . This means that there is no strategy that is a best response to all and every G i satisfying max fg i ; G i g = G. We can circumvent this di¢ culty by considering the upper replacement correspondence R i by putting g i 2 R i (G) if and only if there is some G i such that g i is a best response to G i and max fg i ; G i g = G. It is straightforward to establish that, if b g is a Nash equilibrium, then
In contrast to the case of replacement correspondences, if (19) holds, b g need not be an equilibrium. Thus, the solutions of (19) provide a superset of the Nash equilibria and it is necessary to test each strategy pro…le in the superset to eliminate spurious members. In the particular case analyzed here, it turns out that there are no spurious members; (19) is necessary and su¢ cient for equilibrium 6 . To determine R i , let G i denote the level of G i at which Player i is indi¤erent between not contributing and being the sole contributor:
, Player i will prefer to contribute G i and G = G i . However, if G i > G i , Player i is better o¤ being a free rider and contributing nothing. In this case, G = G i . If G i = G i , the player is indi¤erent between the two strategies and G = G i = G i . This is clear from Figure 9 . The form of the upper replacement correspondence is evident, described in the following proposition.
Proposition 7.1 If Player i has convex, increasing preferences, her upper replacement function R i has domain G i ; 1 and satis…es
This is graphed in Figure 9 . To …nd equilibria, we look for solutions of (19) and observe …rst that b G must lie in the intersection of the domains of all R i . From the proposition, we must have, b G max j G j . The proposition also implies that R i (G) = G for exactly one i. This implies G = G i . If we label every player i for which G i max j G j as potentially active, every solution of (19) has b g i = G i and b g j = 0 for j 6 = i each potentially active player. It is trivial to verify that each such strategy pro…le is indeed a Nash equilibrium, so we have characterized the set of Nash equilibria.
Theorem 7.1 If all players have convex, increasing preferences there is a Nash equilibria are in 1-1 correspondence with the set of potentially active players. In each such equilibrium the potentially active player contributes her preferred level of the public good and no other player contributes.
Note that for best-shot games the theorem implies that (19) is necessary and su¢ cient for an equilibrium and therefore R i acts just like a replacement function.
An example
To illustrate the approach, consider two players with identical Cobb-Douglas preferences: u i = x i G and incomes w i for i = 1; 2. It follows that, if Player 1 o¤ers a transfer of 4 units of income to Player 2, the latter does better to accept and the former also bene…ts. Such a transfer also resolves the coordination problem arising from multiple equilibria. It can be shown further that, if m 2 < 2m 1 < 4m 2 , a player anticipating an equilibrium in which they are sole contributor can …nd a transfer that results in a unique equilibrium with the other player as contributor in which both players have strictly greater payo¤s than the anticipated equilibrium. Indeed, in some simple modi…cations of the two-player game with two equilibria, there will be transfers such that the post-transfer game has a unique equilibrium which strictly Pareto dominates both the equilibria in the original game. Clearly, the topic of transfers in best-shot games deserves further investigation.
Best-shot and better-shot games
In this subsection, we return to the better-shot game of Section 6 and consider what happens as ! 1. In this limit, the CES SCF approaches the bestshot SCF. The next result shows that the CES replacement correspondence approaches that of the best-shot SCF and does so monotonically.
First, consider Player i and note that (G i ; g i ) satis…es (13) as well as equality in (14) . Recall that preferences are Cobb-Douglas, G i is the level of public good provision that Player i would provide if she were the sole contributor and g i is the minimal contribution that Player i will make in equilibrium.
Lemma 7.1 As increases, so does g i and
This shows that the positive component of the replacement correspondence shrinks to the tangency point of the 45 line and the indi¤erence curve in the (G i ; g i ) plane. Thus Player i's replacement correspondence approaches the (upper) replacement correspondence of the best shot game. It follows that i ! 1 as ! 1. Since s i (G) i for G i G G i , the limit of the left hand side of (18) as ! 1 exceeds 1 for any J with two or more members and therefore no such J can be an equilibrium set. All equilibrium sets must be singletons and are therefore equilibria of the best shot game. Thus the best-shot game is more than just an approximation to the bettershot game. Equilibria of the latter can be analyzed by studying the (simpler) former game. It follows that the discussion of transfers in the previous subsection is also applicable to better-shot games.
Conclusion
The pure public good provision model of BBV is an outstandingly tractable model of reciprocal positive externalities. Its usefulness prompts one to enquire whether, and in what ways, its scope can be extended with minimal sacri…ce of tractability. The present paper has explored extensions that modify the form of social composition function while retaining the game's aggregative structure. For reasons of space, we have concentrated on existence and uniqueness and limited ourselves to a few observations on comparative statics such as income redistribution. A more complete treatment of these issues is a subject for future research. Further extensions can also be envisaged that incorporate this aggregative structure -for example, the joint characteristics model of Cornes and Sandler may be revisited. We have explored circumstances under which our approach can be exploited to …nesse what Richard Bellman once called, in another context, the "curse of dimensionality". The time seems ripe for further consideration of the range of interpretations and applications on which the model, and our method of analysis, may shed useful light.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we state and prove a lemma which is used in several other proofs. We then give several proofs displaced from the main text.
Lemma .1 For any i = 1; : : : ; n and > 1, there is a unique x 2 (0; 1)
Writing e x ( ) for this solution, e x ( ) is strictly increasing in and e x ( ) ! (1 + i ) 1 as ! 1.
Note that x = 0 is always a solution of (20), the lemma is concerned with positive solutions.
Proof. It is straightforward to check, using simple di¤erentiation where appropriate, that ' i (0) = 1;
' i is strictly decreasing 7 for all small enough x;
' i is strictly convex. This is illustrated in Figure 10 . It follows that there is a unique e x ( ) 2 (0; 1) such that ' i (e x ( ) ; ) = 1 and that ' i (x; ) is strictly increasing in x in a neighborhood of e x ( ). Since ' i (x; ) is strictly decreasing in for all x 2 (0; 1), we may deduce that e x ( ) increases with . Since e x ( ) < 1 for all > 1 there is x 2 (0; 1] such that e x ( ) ! x as ! 1. Taking this limit in (20) yields (1 + i ) x = 1, completing the proof.
Proof of second assertion in Lemma 5.2. .We start by de…ning
and observing that continuity of b i implies continuity of e i . Note also that, if g i = r i (G) and G i = G i g A. A stationary point is the global maximum if the value of i at that point is not exceeded by that at g i = 0; these two conditions are expressed in (10) and (11) .
B. The global maximum is at g i = 0 if either i G i i (g 0 i ), or the value of i at all stationary points does not exceed that at g i = 0.
The proof is completed by showing that G i is well-de…ned and Case A. holds for G i G i and Case B. for G i G i . This can be achieved by showing that there is a unique G i = G i for which both A. and B. hold and appealing to continuity 8 together with the fact that Case B. holds for large enough G i . Note that both A. and B. hold if and only if marginal payo¤ is zero and the payo¤ equals that at g i = 0; these conditions are equivalent to (8) and (9) .
Raising (9) to the power , multiplying by i , substituting for G i from (8) and dividing by w i +1 i gives ' i (g i =w i ; ) = 1, where ' is de…ned in Lemma .1. Choose g i = w i e x ( ) and G i to satisfy
By construction, g i ; G i satis…es (8) and (9) . Lemma .1 implies that 0 < e x ( ) < (1 + i ) 1 and therefore g i > 0 and G i > 0.
Proof of Lemma 7.1.
In the proof immediately above we showed that ' i [g i =w i ; ] = 1, where ' is de…ned in Lemma .1. Recalling that g i = w i (1 + i ) 1 , this lemma implies that g i " G i as ! 1.
